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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
L, B, FOSTER COMPANY 
a Pennsylvania corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
NELSON BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, and 
INDUSTRIAL INDEMNfTY COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendants and Appellants, 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
10613 
This is a civil action by a Pennsylvania cor= 
poration not authorized to do business in Utah against 
'i general contractor and a bonding company. Plain-
tiff seeks the unpaid portion of the purchase price 
together with a reasonable attorney;s fee, of materials 
supplied by the Plaintiff to a subcontractor for instal= 
lation in the general contractor's project which is a 
part of the Interstate Highway System. The complaint 
is intwocounts: 
L Against both defendants under 14~1~6, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended: and 
II. Against the general contractor under sepa~ 
rate indemnity and guarantee agreement, 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the court sitting with out a 
jury. The court entered judgment against the general 
contractor for the unpaid purchase price together 
with a reasonable attorney's fee and held that the 
Pennsylvania corporation was not doing business 
in Utah within the contemplation of 16-10-120, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants-Appllants ask this court to reverse 
the trial court's determination that the Plaintif Re-
spondent Was not doing business in Utah and therefore 
is precluded from maintaining this action; or thal 
failing, to reverse the trial court's holding thal 
Nelson Brothers Construction Company is liable 
under the so-called indemnity-guaranty agreement: 
2 
·.J1 that failing; to reverse the trial court's award of 
a rea.';onable attorney's fee to Plaintiff-Respondent 
under Count II of its Complaint; and to award De-
fendant-Appellant, Industrial Indemnity Company, a 
reasonable attorney's fee as the prevailing party 
under Count I of PlaintifPs Complaint. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The mate rial facts are presented,substantially, 
in the argument. This statement of facts, therefore, 
represents a summary only of the facts and chrono-
logical events as they are developed in the record. 
Plaintiff below, L. B. Foster Company, is a 
Pennsylvania corporation not authorized to do busi-
ness in Utah. 
L. B. Foster is engaged in numerous business 
enterprises throughout the country including the sup-
plying of aluminum railing; steel cross-beams, 
waivers, sheet piling, etc. for use in construction 
projects (R. 104, 111, 127, 164, Exhibit D-8). 
Ddendant Nelson Brothers Construction Com-
pany is a Nevada corporation with its principal place 
of business in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Nelson Brothers,as prime contractor,was suc-
cessful bidder and was awarded a contract with the 
3 
State of Utah to construct, as part of the Interstate 
Highway System, an overpass in. Utah County known 
as the 11 North Lehi. Project No, IG~15~6 (20) 277; 
3rd Contract. ii Defendantlndustriallndemnity Com, 
pany furnished the contractors bond on the project, 
Bountiful Materials and Construction Company 
(also known as BOMACO) entered into a Subcontract 
Agreement dated April 18, 1963, with Nelson Brothers 
to furnish and install the aluminum railing on the 
project, (Exhibit P-4) Plaintiff-Respondent furnished 
the aluminum railing to Bountiful Materials and Con· 
struction Company who, in turn, installed them in the 
project and was paid the agreed sub-contract price 
except $1,128.00 which was held back pending the 
outcome of this suit and some set-offs claimed by 
Nelson Brothers Construction Company agains~ 
Bountiful Materials and Construction Company (R 
162) 
Bountiful Materials and Construction Com pan) 
failed to pay $2,752.90 of the purchasepriceforsaii 
aluminum railing to L. B. Foster Company. (R. 1, 431 
Reuben Skogerboe was and is employed b) 
Nelson Brothers Construction Company as a "joi 
superintendent.,, 
After completion of this project Plaintiff: 
brought this action for the unpaid portion of the alu· 
4 
r. Ag.11m,1 Nel~on Brothers Construction 
Company md Indu:-trial Indemnity Company under 
Se('.'"'n 1 1i~l-fi. Ut~_h Code Annot3Jed, 1953, as 
amended, r ornmonly known as the 1'Little Miller 
Act):; and 
IL Agalnst Nelson Brothers Construction 
Company alone on the basis that Nelson Brothers 
Construction Company, by virtue of the fact that 
Reuben Skogerboe had signed the letter of June 
10, 1963, which recites: 
* * * 
... in consideration of our delivery of aluminum 
bridge rail to BOMACO, INC. on your job site, 
we ask that you guarantee payment, of our 
invoice in accordance with the terms of your 
subcontract with BOMACO, INC. and that we 
be afforded protection under your bond, ... 
* * * 
had agreed to indemnify and guarantee payment of 
the purchase prlce by Bountiful Materials and Con-
struction Company. (R. 1, 2, 42-44) 
Defendants denied liability under the iiLittle 
Miller Act" on the ground the Plaintiff had not com-
plied with the provisions of said act, compliance 
being a condition precedent to recovery thereunder; 
and defendant, Nelson Brothers, denied liability 
under the so~called 11 agreement" on the ground that 
5 
Reuben Skogerboe did not have authority to bin1 
Nelson Brothers Construction Company under tha 
agreement. 
Both defendants asserted that Plaintiff wai 
precluded from maintaining this action by virtue o 
the fact that it was doing business in Utah without: 
certificate of authority, contrary to Section 16-10· 
120, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. (R. J 
5, 42, 44) 
At the pre-trial the court dismissed Count: 
as against Nelson Brothers Construction Compan) 
(R. 43,44) and Plaintiff admitted that no certificatt 
of authority was held by Plaintiff. (R. 44) 
After trial to the court,_ Judge stewart M 
Hanson gave judgment in the amount of $2, 752.~ 
plus a reasonable attorney's fee to Plaintiff unde! 
Count II of the Complaint and held that Plaintif 
was not doing business in Utah within the contem· 
plation of Section 16-10-120. (R. 49-54) 
Defendants moved the court for a new trial or 
in the alternative for an order amending and makinl 
additional findings and conclusions and amendilll 
the judgment accordingly. (R. 55-59) The court de· 
nied Defendants' motion and this appeal was taken 
6 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
THE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT 11 TRANSACTING BUSI-
NESS)) WITHIN THE STATE OF UTAH AND WAS 
NOT THEREBY BARRED FROM MAINTAINING 
THIS ACTION BY ARTICLE XII, SECTION 9, OF 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
AND SECTION 16-10-120, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
1953, AS AMENDED. 
Article XII, Section 9, of the Constitution of 
the State of Utah Provides: 
No corporation shall do business in this 
State, without having one or more places of 
business, with an authorized agent or agents, 
upon whom process can be served; nor without 
first filing a certified copy of its articles of 
incorporation with the Secretary of State. 
Section 16-10-120, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended, provides in part: 
... No foreign corporation transacting business· 
in this State without certificate of authority 
shall be permitted to maintain any action; suit 
or proceeding in any court of this State, until 
such corporation shall obtain a certificate of 
authority .... 
The i:ourt found: 
7 
* * * 
6. That plaintiff's business in the State of 
Utah was interstate in nature; that all materials 
from plaintiff to Bountiful Materials and Con-
struction Company were shipped to Bountiful 
Materials and Construction Company from 
outside of the State of Utah and that plaintiff 
neither had an office in the State of Utah nor 
agents permanently established in the State 
of Utah; that plaintiff's salesman was only in 
the State of Utah two or three times during the 
year 1963. (R. 51) 
* * * 
From such finding the court concluded: 
* * * 
2. That plaintiff was not doing business 
within the State of Utah within the contemplation 
of the Statute barring plaintiff to act without 
first being qualified to do business under the 
laws of the State of Utah. (R. 52) 
* * * 
The court failed to make any finding with regard 
to Plaintiff's activities respecting the inventory of 
sheet piling although it was specifically requested 
to do so by the Defendants. (R. 55, 57 58) In so 
doing the court has ignored uncontroverted evidence 
that L. B. Foster Company: 
1. Maintained a continuing inventory of shee! 
piling in Utah from before May of 1962 to the time 
of trial. (R. 104-106, 127, 131-135, 149-151, 158, 
Exhibits D-8, D-9, D-10, D-11, D-12, D-13, D-14, 
8 
2, Rer.11nerl title t,o all ofs;:ddsheet piling. (R, 
104, L27, 131·-182, 149, ExhibitD~8) 
3. On at least forty separate occasions from 
Mdy, 1962, until the date of trial, engaged in tran-
5AC tions mvolving sheet pilings stored in Utah, either 
wHh rn.8.h cu8tomers or out-of-state customers. (R. 
105, 139, 142, 153, 157-158, Exhibits D~8, D~l4, and 
D-15) 
4. Negotiated and contracted for the sale or 
rental uf .sheP,t pilings with such customers and 
received payments from such customers direct. 
(Ro 105, 109, 125, 139, 157, Exhibit D-8) 
5. On a continuing basis, rented storage space 
rn Utah from Bud A. J enseri Company, Shurtliff and 
Andrews, Inc., and F. R Truck Line, for the afore-
said inventory of sheet pilings. (R. 104, 106, 127, 131 
133, 135, 136, 140, 141, Exhibit D-8.); and 
6. Issued periodic directives to Bud A. Jensen 
Company, Shurtilif and Andrews, Inc, andF. B. Truck 
Line fr, load or off-load, crop, maintain, tally, etc., 
the sheet pilings and compensated said companies 
therefore, according to a set schedule. (R. 105, 127, 
131, 133, 135, 1:~6, 140, 141, Exhibits D-8, D-14 and 
D-15) 
Ne1E:>on Brothers Construction Company's sec-
9 
retary~treasurer, Emery Nelson, testified that Nel· 
son Brothers Construction Company paid L.B, Fos-
/i f.., /'I·,, C(' 
ter Company $6,26,00 for some of the transactions 
to which it was a party during 1962 and 1963, 
The witness testified that there would bemorethan 
that amount for all of the transactions between Nelson 
Brothers and L. B, Foster. (R. 158) 
There is testimony that the value of the inven· 
tory stockpiled in Utah may have reached, at its 
highest point, u ... between eighty and one hundred 
thousand ... " dollars. (R. 138) 
Plaintiff seeks to avoid the fact that these activ· 
ities constitute utransacting of business" in UtahbJ 
introducing testimony to the effect that these transac· 
tions represent only a small percentage of the total 
business, or even of the business with Utah concerns 
done by L. B. Foster. Plaintiff cannot escape the 
conclusion that for the past four or more years,i! 
has continued tom aintain an inventory of goods within 
the State, has continued to deal with the goods insaiC 
inventory and has continued to engage in transactiom 
involving parts of said inventory with customers, boti 
local and out-of-state. Activities of this type have 
been consistently held to constitute the doing of busi· 
ness within this State. See Mud Control Laboratories 
vs. Covey, 2 U. (2d) 85, 269 P. (2d) 854. See also the 
10 
t~xic~n,· ive ::i.rni• •1 0.1 inn in What Constitutes Doing Busi~ 
t1!'=':;":__~~~3 Q5JEE_'2E_'.:l:tn')n in Stites Foreign to the State 
~J its ~_!'eation 196JL Corporation Trust Company, pp. 
68~69, The authorities compiled therein lead 
Corporation Trust Company to conclude that: 
A foreign corporation which maintains a 
stock of goods within a state, from which it 
ma.kes deliveries to customers in the state, 
is 0rdlnarily regarded by the courts as doing 
Lusiness and required to qualify. It does not 
appear to be significant whether the stock is 
large or smaH, or whether it is located in a 
public warehouse, storeroom, office, freight 
car or any other place 
It has also been held that qualification is 
required where the foreign corporation main-
tains "spot" stocks strategically-located so as 
to furnish customers with quickdelivery. This 
is true although the bulk of the orders are 
filled from outside the state. 
Moreover, the Plaintiff cannot escape the inevi-
table couclusion that it has, on numerous occasions, 
and on a continuing basis over the past four or more 
years, engaged in the business of leasing and selling 
personal property in this state. This conduct together 
with thP other factors (retainingtitletothesheetpil-
ings, hiring storage facilities, contracting for the 
protection, maintenance, loading and off-loading of 
the sheet pilings, etc.) gives rise to the conclusion 
thilt L, B, Foster Company was transacting business 
11 
in Utah, Western Outdoor Advertising Company vs, 
Berbiglia, Inc,, (Mo,) 263 S, W, (2d) 205, See also: 
What Constitutes Doing Business By a CorporationE 
States Foreign. to The State of Its Creation 1965. 
supn; pin 62=63. 
It is conceeded that L, B. Foster Company was 
not authorized to do business in the State of Utah. 
(R. 44). 
Presumably, a substantial sum has accrued to 
the State of Utah and to the County of Salt Lake for 
license taxes, sales taxes from the sales and lease 
transactions conducted in this State, income taxes 
from the income derived from said sales and rentals; 
and property taxes on the inventory maintained in the 
State. Plaintiff's Sales Manager in Charge of Con· 
struction Products testified that he did not know ii 
L, B. Foster Company had paid inventory, income 
or sales taxes in Utah, (R. 129) 
The State of Utah has a substantial and legm 
mate right to tax and license foreign corporatioru 
transacting business in Utah and to this end hai 
provided sanctions, penal in nature, to enforce com· 
pliance with its licensing requirements: It has denie~ 
access to the courts to corporations not in com· 
pliance. This court should uphold the State's righl 
to compel compliance and should deny the PlaintilJ 
12 
::icces~ to the courts in this case. 
POINT IL THE COURT ERRED INHOLDING THAT 
DEFENDANT, NELSON BROTHERS CONSTRUC~ 
TION COMPANY, WAS INDEBTED TO PLAINTIFF 
UNDER COUNT TI OF PLAINTIFF 9S COMPLAINT. 
The trial court in its memorandum decision 
held that: ii,,. the Plaintiff is entitled to recover under 
the Indemnity and Guaranty Agreement introduced 
in evidence and as set forth in Count II .... 19 (R. 49) 
In the Findings of Fact submitted by the Plain-
tiff and signed by the court, the court found: 
* * * 
3. That Defendant Nelson Brothers Con-
struction Company executed an Idemnity and 
Guaranty Agreement under date of October 17, 
1963 indemnifying the Plaintiff against failure 
of Bountiful Materials and Construction Com-
pany to make payment to the Plaintiff for 
materials furnished and sold to Bountiful 
Materials and Construction Company. 
4. That theDefendantfsic_7ReubenSkog-
erboe, was the superintendentofNelsonBroth-
e.;:_'S Construction Company and was vested with 
authority to sign said indemnity agreement ... 
* * * 
At the trial, the court admitted into evidence 
over Defendants' objections Exhibit P-1, apurported 
Indemnity and Guaranty Agreement executed by 
Reuben G. Skngerboe, Supt., for Nelson Brothers 
13 
Construction Company under date of October 17, 
1963. Defendants did not deny that Reuben Skogerboe 
signed said Exhibit or that said Reuben Skogerboe 
was employed by Nelson Brothers Construction Corn· 
pany as a 66 job superintendent. 11 Defendants vigorous· 
ly did deny, however, that said Reuben Skogerboe 
had authority to execute said exhibit or that Nelson 
Brothers Construction Company was bound thereby. 
(R. 40, 44, 80-81, 98 and Exhibit P-1) The following 
transpired in connection with the reception of said 
Exhibit P-1 into evidence: 
MR. MECHAM: We offer in evidence Plaintiffls 
Exhibit No. 1, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Any objection, Mr. Housley? 
MR. HOUSLEY: Your Honor, we object to its 
admission for the purpose of showing that 
Reuben Skogerboe had authority to enter into 
the agreement. If it has another purpose 
other than that, then I would like to know 
what it is. 
Mr. MECHAM: One of the purposes, your 
Honor, is that it is an agreement between 
L, B. Foster and Nelson Brothers Con· 
struction Company. 
THE COURT: He is going to have to show tha! 
Skogerboe had authority before it is binding. 
I will admit it with the understanding that he 
has to show it. 
MR. HOUSLEY: Very well. We have no objec· 
14 
r.i1)t. exu-:p( for that thing. (R. 93~94) 
Plain tiff c: r.i 11 ed both Reuben Skogerboe and 
Emery NAlson as witnesses, but failed to ask either 
of them whether Reuben Skogerboe had authority to 
execute Exhibit P~l. 
Admittedly when a fact of agency is uncontro-
verted or admitted, and the agent was apparently act-
ing for his principal as to the business inhand, the 
burden is on the principal to show that the agent 
exceeded his authority. 3 Am Jur (2d) 707, Agency 
Sec. 350. Defendants have sustained said burden 
by direct and unequivocable testimony. 
Nelson Brothers Construction Company's sec-
-! fSf 1[1" (4 
retary-treasurer, Emery G. Nelsol\' on direct exam-
ination by Defendants' attorney, that in his capacity 
as f~ecretary-treasurer and one of the directors of 
the corporlltion that he had occasion to know the 
authority of Nelson Brothers Construction Com-
pany's superintendents. He testified that Nelson 
Brothers variously hired from two to eight "job 
superintendents i 5and that all the"job superintendents·~ 
had the same authority on work and the same place 
in the hierarchy of Nelson Brothers Construction 
Company as did Reuben Skogerboe. Moreover he 
testified that Reuben Skogerboe did not have corpor-
ate authority to sign subcontract agreements and did 
15 
not have corporate authority to sign guarantys or 
indemnities with suppliers or subcontractors" (R. 
154= 155). 
Mr" Nelson testified: 
Q (by Mr. Housley) Will you tell the court wha! 
corporate authority Reuben Skogerboe had vis· 
a=vis these two exhibits, 11 Exhibit P-1 arid P-2,1 
which I believe you have already seen. 11 P-1, 
P=2, P-3 and P-4, 1' will you tell the coun 
what corporate authority Reuben Skogerboe 
had with reference to those? 
A As preliminary to that I could saythatjot 
superintendents, in our company at least, have 
the general authority of negotiating the terms 
of the subcontracts. That is negotiating wha1 
type of work is to be done and determiningwha1 
price will be charged, and sometimes they havE 
the same authority to do that with materials anc 
equipment. In general, they coordinate and plar 
the work. 
However, ordinarily the form al written pur· 
chase orders and written subcontracts ar~ 
made up in our central office and signed by a 
corporate officer. The job superintendent, ol 
course, has authority to follow up on deliveJ'] 
of material, or when the subcontractor woulc 
be on the job, they are our contact man. How· 
ever, they don't, of course, have authority tr 
actually pay for materials except very minor 
things that have to be paid for immediately oi 
the job when delivered, such as once in a whilt 
a freight bill. 
Q Let me interrupt. Is there a separate accoun 
to pay those from? 
16 
,4_, Gene ralh when we h~.ve a distant ]r>b we 
"nmetirnPs spr up 1:1, small cherkrng ;:iccountthat 
Wf' :.i 11 ow the 1 ob superintendent to sign r,hecks 
on, to pay for small things that have to be pq,id 
for irnmedi?.1tely when dellvered to the job. Ev= 
e rythlng else is pa.id for from the central 0fflc6, 
after apIJroval there, and that has been the gen= 
eral procedure in making up the subcontracts 
and the large purchase order. 
Now, srn3.ll purchase orders we have aJ= 
lo'Ned the job superintendent to write thoseo 
Ordina,rily it ls general procedure. 
Qo When you Bay small purchase order, what 
range are you talking about? 
A, Well, I would say a few hundred dollars. 
It would vary. 
Q. When you say large purchase orders, what 
are you talking about there? 
A, I 'lm speaking of severalthousanddollars, 
R thousand. dollar order, several thousand. 
Q. Now the question was vis=a=vis these 
specffjc documents, what was Reuben Skoger= 
bot:'::> corporate authority? 
A. WeH, he really had no corporate authority 
lo exi:;cute this guarantee, whatever you call it, 
wHh L, B. Foster Company. He did have au-
tl.ority to work out the terms, and with BOM-
ACO, the subcontractor. However, the subcon~ 
tn1ct itseJf should have been made out or signed 
by a corporate officer, that has been authorized 
by the norporation to enter into such agree= 
ments. 
17 
Q, So that as I understand your answer, he does 
not have that authority to execute that subcone 
tract agreement, is that correct? 
A, Not actually, no, (R.-155-157) 
On cross-examination Mr, Nelson testified that 
Nelson Brothers Construction Company does not have 
a written job description for job superintendents 
(R. 160) 
In its effort to prove that Reuben Skogerboe was 
authorized to execute the so-called indemnity-guar-
anty agreement, Plaintiff established the fact that 
Reuben Skogerboe signed the original subcontract 
agreement with Bountiful Materials and Construction 
Company, which fact Defendants conceeded. Defend· 
ants, however, denied that Reuben Skogerboe haa 
authority to execute the subcontract agreement. 
(R. 98) -/-e_sf111-,l1v•/ &1 fllt•t_,..,ftf/
1'> J~i/~s 
In addition, the following"was offered by thE 
Plaintiff, apparently for the purpose of establishing 
customary authority: 
Q, Now, with reference to the custom of the 
trade1 in accepting orders from general con· 
tractors, what is the custom, if you know, witl 
reference to dealing with superintendents~ 
MR, HOUSLEY~ Objection, your Honor. N( 
sufficient foundation. 
THE COURT: 0. K. Lay a foundation, Mr. 
18 
Mech:nn 
Q, <By Mr, Mecham) Mr, McClelland, when 
you df'a I wHh a general contractor to take an 
order, which is, as the oneyoutookinthispar= 
twular cAse, theNelsonorder, ortheBOMACO 
order, for rnateriaJs that L, B. Foster fur= 
rtisheii, what procedure do you follow? 
A, Well, in most of the cases we would, being 
out. of sti:l.te, call long distance, generally 
through the receptionist or the switch board 
operator, a8king her who is handling a par-
ticular job, I would say thatin most cases she 
wi11 tell you that you will have to get in touch 
with the project qi1perintendent, or the project 
manager, that he i8 handling this job, And the 
buy lng will be done from the j obsite or they may 
do it from the office, but he is the only man 
that can answer the questions that we would 
be after at that time, 
MR. HOUSLEY: I object, your Honor. I donjt 
think there is any basis laid for his statement 
that he lB the only man that--
Would you read that back? 
(The last answer was readbythe reporter.) 
MR MECHAM: We are trying to establish what 
the custom of the business is, when he contacts a 
customer. 
Q. (by Mr. Mecham) Would the same thing ap-
ply to Job Superintendents? 
A. Yes. (R. 50-51) 
19 
It is clear from the foregoing that the court cor-
rectly required the Plaintiff to lay a foundation be-
fore permitting the plaintiff's witness to testify With 
regard to the custom in the trade, and it is equally 
clear that the Plaintiff failed to lay such foundation 
and further that the Plaintiff's witness's testimon1 
falls far short of establishing that it is the custom ir 
the trade that job superintendents have authority tu 
execute indemnity-guaranty agreements with firmi 
supplying materials to subcontractors. The evidencf 
does not support the trial court's findingthatReubel 
Skogerboe had authority to bind Nelson Brothers Con· 
struction Company under the so-called indemnity· 
guaranty agreement. 
POINT III. THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTINf 
PLAINTIFF A REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FE! 
IN CONNECTION WITH COUNT II OF PLAINTIFF': 
COMPLAfNT. 
A, The court erred in permitting an amena· 
ment to the pre-trial order adding the issue o 
whether Plaintiff was entitled to a reasonable attor· 
ney's fee under the alleged indemnity-guarant 
agreement. 
Count II of Plaintiff's Complaint alleges thl 
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Defend.rnts :ign~ed to indemnify and gu::i rantee pay-
ment of alummurn bridge railing. The prayer of 
Plaintiff's Comµlarnt asks for $2, 752.90 plus area= 
sonable attornPy's fee, plus interest thereon, to-
gether · w it:h costs of court under Count r. and for 
$2, 752.00, plus interest and costs of court under 
Count II, There is no mention either in the body or in 
the prayer of Count II of a reasonable attorney is fee. 
(R. 2). 
At the pre~tria] the only mention of attorney's 
fees was in connection with Count I of Plaintiffis 
Complaint and the pre~trial order made the question 
whether attorney 1s fees are due under the statute 
as one of the issues to be tried. No mention of at-
torney',c; in connection with Count II was made in the 
pre-trial order. (R. 43) 
Plaintiff made a formal motion to amend the 
pre-trial order and noticed it up for hearing at 10:00 
0
5clock A M. on the morning of the trial. Attorney 1s 
fees under Count II was not mentioned in Plaintifrs 
Motion To Amend Pre-Trial Order. (R. 46, 4 7) 
At 10:00 o'clock A.M. on the morning of the trial, 
Plaintiff orally moved the court to amend the pre-
trial order to permit, as an issue to be tried, 
whether attorney's fees "under the agreement of 
June 10, 1963n should be allowed to Plaintiff. Over 
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Defendants' vigorous objections, Plaintiff's motion 
was granted. (R. 78, 79) 
Rule 54 (c), Utah Rules Of Civil Procedure, 
prov ides as follows: 
(c) Demand for Judgment. 
(1) Generally. Except astoapartyagainst 
whom a judgment is entered by default, every 
final judgment shall grant the relief to which 
the party in whose favor it is rendered is en· 
titled, even if the party has not demanded such 
relief in his pleadings. It may be given for or 
against one or more of several claimants: anc 
it may, when the justiceofthecaserequiresit, 
determine the ultimate rights of the partieso1 
each side as between or among themselves. 
* * * 
It has been held that this rule should be liberallr 
construed to allow parties considerable latitude i! 
pleading and proof. But it has also been held repeat· 
edly that this rule should not be used to work ru 
injustice upon the opposing party and that the op-
posing party should always be accorded a fair 
opportunity to be apprised of and meet the issue~ 
so presented. 
This Co~~Jr Taylor vs. E. M. Royle Col]. 
I U. (2d) 175, 2641'279~ said! 
It is true that our new rule should be liber· 
ally construed to secure a just .... determinatioI 
of every action, but they do not represent a one· 
way street down which but one litigant may trav· 
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eL The rulPs allow locomotion in both direc= 
tions by aU interested travelers. They allow 
plai.ntiffs cons tderable latitude in pleading and 
proof, to a point where some people have ex= 
pressed the opinion that careless legal crafts= 
manship has been invited rather than discour= 
'3,ged. Be that as it may, a defendant must be 
extended every reasonable opportunity to pre= 
pare his case and to meet an adversary 1s 
claims. Also he must be protected against 
surprise and be assured equal opportunity and 
facility to present and prove counter conten= 
tions. -else unilateral justice and injustice 
would result sufficient to raise serious doubts 
as to the constitutional due process guarantees. 
The ultimate deiermination of the issue whether 
attorn~y's fees should be granted under Count II 
depends on the wording of Exhibit P-1, an instrument 
whose provisions are obscure to say the least. To 
allow the amendment requiring defendants to meet 
this issue without an opportunity to go into discovery 
on the question of the intention of the parties in the 
execution of the alleged instrument or even to do 
minimal research on the law governing the issue, 
is manifestly unjust. Taylor vs. E. M. Royle Corp., 
supra. 
B. The evidence adduced at trial does not sup-
port the court's Findings andconclusionsthatPlain-
tiff is entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee under 
Count II. 
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The trial court's findings of fact include tht 
following'. 
* * * 
5" That the said Indemnity Agreement pro. 
vided the same protection to Plaintiff agail!E 
loss as would have been provided under tb1 
Payment and Performance Bond issued by th, 
defendant, Industrial Indemnity Company.(R.51 
* * * 
The payment and performance bond issued b 
defendant, Industrial Indemnity Company for the pro 
ject under consideration here was never introduce 
into evidence at the trial nor was there any evidenc 
adduced whatever pertaining to the provisions of sai 
bond. Moreover, the so-called indemnity-guarant 
agreement (Exhibit P-1) was o~ly received into e1 
idence with the understanding that Plaintiff wouldb 
required to show Reuben Skogerboe's authority t 
Nelson Brothers Construction Company thereunder 
which authority was never shown. See the argume1 
under Point II above. 
Even if the so-called indemnit~aranty agref 
ment (Exhibit P-1) eh;ill be deemed to have been prt 
perly received, the words contained therein, "ar 
that we be afforded protection under your bond," cai 
not be said to give rise to a right to attorney's fet 
without further evidence as to their meaning or to tl 
intent of the parties in placing them there. 
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POINT IV, THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
AWARD A REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEE TO 
DEFENDANT, INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY COM= 
PANY, AS THE PREVAILING PARTY IN CON-
NECTION WITH COUNT I OF PLAINTIFFiS COM= 
PLAINT, 
Sectlon 14~~1=8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended, provides as follows: 
fn any action brought upon either of the 
bonds provided herein, or against the public 
body failing to obtain the delivery of the pay= 
ment bond., the prevailing party, upon each 
separate . cause of action, shall recover a 
reasonable attorneY.,1s fee to be taxed as costs . 
. ~emphasis added__/ 
In the prayer 0ontained in Defendants' Answer 
to Count I, Defendants pray that they be awarded 
a reasonable attorney's fee. (R. 4). Count I of 
Plaintiff's Complaint is brought under 14-1~6, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended which provides 
under certain conditions that a materials supplier 
can sue on the payment bond for the value of the 
materials supplied but unpaid for. Clearly this is 
an action ubrought upon either of the bonds provided 
herein" giving rise to attorney's fees under Section 
14=1-8. The court at pre-trial dismissed Count I 
as against Nelson Brothers Construction Company, 
The pre ·trial court further stated: 
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The pleadings now stand with the dismissal 
of the first Count against Nelson Brothers. 
Plaintiff is suing on Count I against the Indus-
trial Indemnity Company and on Count II against 
Nelson Brothers Construction Company. (R. 44) 
The trial courfs memorandum decision expres-
sly grants judgment to Plaintiff under Count II and, 
impliedly, against Plaintiff under Count I. Thf 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law submittet 
by the Plaintiff for signature by the court do no1 
make reference to any disposition under Count I 
(R. 50-52.) The judgment prepared by Plaintiff an( 
submitted to the Court for its signature and signe' 
by the court on March 16, 1966 expressly provide: 
that it is: 
OBDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
* * * 
2. Defendant Industrial Indemnity Compan, 
is awarded judgment of no cause for actior 
(R. 53) 
* * * 
That defendant Industrial Indemnity Compan 
is the prevailing party in an action brought upon oi 
of the bonds under the Little Miller Act seems harill. 
disputable. 
This court in Checketts v. Colli~s, 78 U. 93 li 
(2d) 950 75 ALR 1393, cited the following langu~ 
from Ballard Transfer and Storage Company vs.J 
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ti 
l. P'!ui C 1tyJ-ll~ CQ., l29 Minn. 494, 152 RW, 868, 869, 
:- wHh ::ipprov::il: 
lt 
The Pl lintiff is the party who starts. the 
L1wr:uiL The suit terminates on thB verdict 
or decls iorL ff thereby the one who instituted 
the action- obtains noth1ng 1 he certainly does 
n1>t prevail over his adversary. The defend= 
ant rect=nving the verdict in his favor-, is ac-
quitted of wrongdoing towards the plaintiff. 
In tM~ case there was a counterclaim, but 
that can have no bearing ... the jury found either 
both to blame or else neither. In the either 
8Vent P18jntHf h3d no cause to bring suit and 
m :ike expense for defendant. Had defendant 
been let alone, Jt m:iy never have sought redress 
in court. In actions at law, whether for torts 
or upon contract, we think it has always been 
understood in this state that the party in whose 
favor the verdict goes recovers costs and 
disbursemente against the other. And we so 
hold. 
The fact situation in Checketts yL. Collings was 
more extreme than the one in the case at bar. There, 
,:c 11.' ci 
the defendant had brought a counter-claim a& the 
1 court found upon the counter-claim against the defen.., 
dant and in favor of the plaintiff, no cause of action. 
This crmrt rejected the argllment in the Checketts 
case that the result was more in the nature of a 
stand-off ot.nd held that defendant was the prevailing 
party, under a statute which allowed costR as a mat= 
ter of course to the prevailing party, and the defen-
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dant was therefore entitled to his costs. 
Here, as opposed to the situation in th. 
Checketts case, the victory is clear. 
The present rule with regard to costs, Rui1 
54 (d)(l) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, leaves th 
matter of the allowance of costs somewhat to th 
discretion of the court under the following languagf 
Costs shall be allowed as of course to u, 
prevailing party unless the court otherwis 
directs, 
Section 14~1~8 does not, however, contain 
provision allowing the court discretion in tt 
matter. 
It is respectfully submitted that the allowam 
of attorney's fees to be taxed as costs to fndustri 
Indemnity Company herein is not subject to ti 
discretion of the court under Section 14~1-8, 
It is urged that the legal services requin 
to defend an action under the Little Miller Act a: 
just as extensive as those required to prosecute su1• 
action and that the attorney's fee which ought to 
allowed to Industrial Indemnity Company should 
the same as those which would have been allowed 
the plaintiff had it prevailed, which amount has b~ 
stipulated to be that recommended by the Utah SU 
Bar in their Minimum Recommended Fee Sch~ 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The evidence clearly shows that Plaintiff was 
doing buslness in the State of Utah wHhout having 
1i1 obtained B. certlfic;:ite of quaUfication to do business 
herein and is therefore prohlbib~d from maintaining 
thi5 action under Section 16=10=120, Utah Code 
Annotated. ms:.>, aR amended, and this Court Ahould 
rev<"r,qe the hlal rourt'~ deti~rmination to that effect 
5 and shmJld ordf:r th::i.t Judgrnpnj; be entered for the 
Defendants ::iccordinglv o 
Moreover, the ev1dence is insufficient to sustain 
the finding thB l Reuben Skogerboe was authorized to 
bir1d Nelson Brothers Construction Company under 
( the so=c.::iHed Indemnity~Guaranty AgreemenL 
Plointiff's failure to raise timely the issue of 
l Rttorney 9 f" fees in connection with Count II and the 
failure of the evidence to sustain the award of 
'i att.orneyjs foes make it manifestly unjust that attor~ 
l ney:s fees be awarded to Plaintiff under Count II of 
1
1
• its Complaint, 
Industrial Indemnity Company as the prevailing 
party under Count I of this action is entitled to a 
reasonable attorney's fee in connection therewith 
~ in the sum nf $6200 94 under Section 14-1-8, Utah 
1 Code Annotates!, 1953, as amended. 
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Respectfully submitted this 13th day of July, 1966. 
JAMES F, HOUSLEY 
Attorney for Defendants-Appellants 
1020 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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